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Microbial colonies are experimental model systems for studying the colonization of new territory
by biological species through range expansion. We study a generalization of the two-species Eden
model, which incorporates local frequency-dependent selection, in order to analyze how social inter-
actions between two species influence surface roughness of growing microbial colonies. The model
includes several classical scenarios from game theory. We then concentrate on an expanding public
goods game, where either cooperators or defectors take over the front depending on the system pa-
rameters. We analyze in detail the critical behavior of the nonequilibrium phase transition between
global cooperation and defection and thereby identify a new universality class of phase transitions
dealing with absorbing states. At the transition, the number of boundaries separating sectors decays
with a novel power law in time and their superdiffusive motion crosses over from Eden scaling to a
nearly ballistic regime. In parallel, the width of the front initially obeys Eden roughening and, at
later times, passes over to selective roughening.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 68.35.Ct, 68.35.Rh, 87.18.Hf, 87.23.-n
I. INTRODUCTION
Living species are usually confined to their territory, a
spatial region defined by geographical borders, climate,
or other environmental constraints. Uninhabited regions
are colonized through range expansion, where individuals
reproduce and disperse at the front of their territory [1].
This process is seen in biological invasions [2], as a result
of shifting climate zones [3–5], during colonizations in
our own species’ history [6–8], tumor growth [1, 9, 10],
and biofilm growth [11–13]. Evidently, expansions occur
on very different spatial (micrometers to 107 meters) and
temporal (hours to millennia) scales.
In this article we aim to characterize range expansion
under the influence of short-range “social interactions”
of individuals at the front. Such interactions are present
if success in reproduction depends on the presence of
nearby individuals of the own and/or other species. Here,
we set up a model for the expanding front based on evo-
lutionary game theory [14–16] and investigate its rough-
ening dynamics for two interacting species. Besides ex-
ploring an interesting non-equilibrium growth process, we
hope to contribute to interpreting experiments on range
expansion in multi-species colonies of simple organisms.
In experiments, microbial growth is excellently suited
to study range expansion and other processes in pop-
ulation dynamics and evolution such as spatial spread
of infections and adaptation to an environment (see for
example Ref. [17]). Microbes reproduce fast, their en-
vironment and genotype can be controlled, and exper-
imental conditions are easily reproducible. Grown in a
Petri dish, the spatial patterns of single-species microbial
colonies have long been a rich field of study [18–22]. The
observed patterns crucially depend on motility, availabil-
ity of nutrients, and the growth medium, to name but a
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few. However, even under conditions of negligible motil-
ity and abundant nutrients a colony’s front is rough and
has interesting statistical properties [23–25].
Multi-species colonies are composed of more than one
species and show additional intriguing features, even if
the species are identical except for a marker [26]. During
reproduction they keep their marker but compete with
other species for space at the front. Thereby, sectors of
single species form, which are separated by boundaries.
Their statistical and dynamic properties are determined
by the evolving roughness of the expanding front [27, 28].
Usually, when two or more species of microbes live in
a common environment, they influence each other dur-
ing reproduction. In particular, reproductive success of
any species, also called its fitness, depends on the pop-
ulation sizes of all the species. This constitutes “social
interactions” between the species commonly referred to
as frequency-dependent selection. Research in the field
has initiated a wealth of fascinating experiments [10, 29–
35] either in well-mixed liquid culture without any spatial
order [31, 36] or in the Petri dish, where the populations
are spatially structured [37, 38]. Many of the experimen-
tal observations can be discussed within the framework
of evolutionary game theory [14–16]. For example, light
has been shed on a long-standing theoretical question in
evolution [14, 15, 39, 40]: Why do individuals cooperate
if non-cooperators can exploit them? Literature empha-
sizes the importance of a population to be structured
in groups [15, 41–45], for example, by spatial distance.
While within a single group cooperators are always in-
ferior to non-cooperating defectors, if the latter interact
only with their neighborhood, distant large groups of co-
operators will ultimately outcompete defectors. Some
models also stress the central role of demographic fluctu-
ations and of populations growing in size [46, 47]. Both,
experiments and theory, explain the advantage of coop-
erators during colony growth by their ability to locally
advance faster [38, 48, 49], vividly termed “survival of
ar
X
iv
:1
50
7.
00
64
9v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.b
io-
ph
]  
2 J
ul 
20
15
2the fastest” [38].
Cooperation between between nearby cells is often me-
diated by some biochemical compound (a public good)
which the microbes release into the extracellular envi-
ronment. This compound then promotes reproduction of
neighboring cells. In general, a released substance may
act beneficial or detrimental to other individuals, also
depending on their species, and implies some cost to the
producer. Examples include secretion of digestive inver-
tase to break down sucrose [36, 50–52], siderophores to
scavenge iron from the environment [31, 53, 54], poly-
mers which support biofilms [41, 55, 56], release of tox-
ins [57, 58] (sometimes through lysis [59, 60]), surfactants
which facilitate swarming [61], and the exchange of amino
acids [37].
This plethora of biochemical compounds, released by
cells and affecting nearby cells, implies a wealth of spe-
cific features, which certainly are not covered by a sin-
gle model. However, since the released biomolecules
usually mediate short-range interactions between indi-
viduals, properties on large scales should be indepen-
dent of microscopic details. Hence, we formulate a sim-
ple model which captures the essence of an interaction
while ignoring complicated details. The classical Eden
model [62, 63], a simple growth process on a lattice, has
been used successfully to mimic growing cell colonies.. It
generates a cluster (the colony), the surface of which ex-
hibits scaling properties also found for expanding fronts
of microbial colonies [64, 65]. Extended to two identi-
cally growing but still distinguishable species, it gener-
ates sectors occupied by a single species only [28, 66].
Indeed, this behavior is found for two-species micro-
bial colonies [26]. Moreover, boundaries between sectors
move superdiffusively as in the experiments.
In this article we explore a generalization of the two-
species Eden model, which incorporates local frequency-
dependent selection. We thereby aim to analyze how
social interactions influence surface roughness of grow-
ing microbial colonies. We set up an expanding public
goods game, where either cooperators or defectors take
over the front depending on the system parameters [14–
16]. Right at the transition the front displays critical
behavior, which we analyze in detail. In particular, we
establish that our model belongs to a new universality
class of phase transitions dealing with absorbing states.
At the transition, the number of boundaries separating
sectors decays with a novel power law in time and their
superdiffusive motion crosses over from Eden scaling to
a nearly ballistic regime. In parallel, the width of the
front initially obeys Eden roughening and, at later times,
passes over to what we call selective roughening.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
To analyze multi-species microbial colony growth, we in-
troduce the Eden model with frequency-dependent selec-
tion in Sec. II and analyze its phenomenology in Sec. III.
We then concentrate on the expanding public goods game
with its social dilemma in Sec. IV and analyze the critical
behavior at the transition between long-term cooperation
species 2
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FIG. 1. Two-species Eden model with frequency-dependent
selection on a hexagonal lattice. The bacterial colony grows
from the bottom line (lattice sites with narrow black edge)
of length L, where individuals of species 1 (blue) and species
2 (red) occupy the lattice sites. The colony expands into
the empty, infinitely-extended half-space. Individuals capable
of reproduction (indicated by bold edges), have at least one
empty lattice site as a nearest neighbor. In a reproduction
event, one of these empty neighboring sites (i, j) is chosen
with equal probability and the reproducing individual changes
the corresponding state si,j to its own state 1 or 2. Each
individual has its own reproduction rate bi,j given in Eq. (1).
For example, the reproduction rate of the individual at site
(3, 3) (bold black edges) is b3,3 = b
0
2 + 3T + 2P. Along the
transverse direction periodic boundary conditions apply.
and long-term defection by applying statistical analysis.
Finally, we discuss and summarize our findings in Sec. V.
II. EDEN MODEL WITH
FREQUENCY-DEPENDENT SELECTION
In this work we employ a lattice model (see Fig. 1)
to analyze range expansion at rough fronts under the in-
fluence of frequency-dependent selection. We set up a
cellular automaton on a two-dimensional hexagonal1 lat-
tice of transverse extension L and an infinite longitudinal
extension. Periodic boundary conditions are applied in
the transverse direction. The state {s} of the system at
time t is specified by the state variables si,j of lattice sites
(i, j). Consider a system with two species (extension to
more species is straightforward). For any time t, any site
(i, j) is either empty (si,j = 0) or occupied by an indi-
vidual of either species 1 (si,j = 1) or 2 (si,j = 2). All
individuals which have at least one free nearest neighbor
site can reproduce. To perform a reproduction step, we
choose one of these fecund individuals with a probability
proportional to its reproduction rate (see below) and a
1 On a square lattice it is impossible to enclose a cluster A within
a cluster B, which only contains nearest neighbor sites of cluster
A. On a hexagonal lattice this is possible.
3new individual of the same species is placed with equal
probability on one of the free neighboring sites.
In contrast to the Eden model [62] and some of its two-
species generalizations [28, 67], reproduction rates in our
model depend on the states of the nearest-neighbor sites.
Let n1 and n2 denote the number of nearest neighbors of
species 1 and 2, respectively, then the reproduction rate
of an individual at lattice site (i, j) is
bi,j =

0 if si,j has no free neighbors,
b01 + n1R+ n2S if si,j = 1,
b02 + n1T + n2P if si,j = 2.
(1)
Here, b01 and b
0
2 are the respective contributions to the
reproduction rates of species 1 and 2, which are indepen-
dent of the states of their nearest neighbors. Frequency-
dependent selection is introduced through the parameters
R, S, T , and P.
With the reproduction rates bi,j we implement a ran-
dom sequential update of the system using a simplified
version of the Gillespie algorithm [68]. The overall re-
production rate of the population is btot :=
∑
i,j bi,j and
an individual at site (i, j) is selected to reproduce with
probability bi,j/btot. We then choose one of the empty
nearest-neighbor sites of the reproducing individual at
random and place there a new individual of the same
species. This implies that there are no mutations. Since
the mean time until the next reproduction event is b−1tot,
we update time by t → t + b−1tot after each reproduction
event. We assume that individuals do not die and that
they are immobile. Therefore, any site with si,j 6= 0
remains in its specific state indefinitely. As initial condi-
tion we occupy all sites of an initial line randomly, but in
equal parts, with species 1 and 2, if not stated otherwise.
The formulated model generalizes version C of the
Eden model, introduced by Jullien and Botet [69], to a
two-species system. We already applied a similar model
to range expansion without frequency-dependent selec-
tion but included the possibility of mutations [67]. If R,
S, T , and P are zero, our model reduces to that of Saito
and Mu¨ller-Krumbhaar [28], however they used a square
lattice. Since diffusion is not included in the model, con-
figurations and patterns behind the front are frozen. This
corresponds to observations in microbial experiments on
range expansion [26, 60].
In game theory the parameters R, S, T , and P
from Eq. (1) define the payoff matrix of a two-strategy
game [14–16]. Different scenarios, some well known in
game theory, are implemented if we set these parameters
accordingly.
III. PHENOMENOLOGY
We now describe some generic examples of our model
for growing microbial colonies (see Fig. 2), which emerge
for typical parameter settings, and discuss their charac-
teristic features. We then concentrate on so-called so-
FIG. 2. Growth patterns of our model for different param-
eters, which correspond to typical settings. Time is always
t = 15 and lattice size is L = 200. Cooperators are depicted in
blue and defectors in red. If not stated otherwise b02 = b
0
2 = 1,
R = P = S = T = 0, and the initial ratio of both species is
1:1. (a) neutral growth, (b) selective advantage for species 2
(b02 = 1.5), which occupies 10% of initial sites, (c) coordina-
tion game (R = P = 1), (d) snowdrift game (S = T = 1),
and (e) public goods game (R = 0.1, T = 1.1).
cial dilemmas, where one species (defectors) exploits the
other one (cooperators). Due to the spatial extent of our
system, cooperators are able to outcompete defectors in
a defined parameter region. This is in contrast to a single
group, where all members interact with each other and,
therefore, cooperators are always inferior to defectors.
In the simplest case selection is frequency-independent,
R = S = T = P = 0, and both species reproduce with
the same rate, b10 = b
2
0 [see Fig. 2(a)]. For this “neutral”
setting we observe roughening of the front typical for the
Eden model [62, 63]. Simultaneously, sectors composed of
a single species merge and thereby coarsen [28, 66]. This
inherent process happens according to the following sce-
nario. If the tips of two advancing boundary lines meet,
they annihilateand the enclosed sector loses contact to
the front. Consequently, the number of boundaries and
sectors can only decrease. Sectors repeatedly coarsen as
they merge in these events. When all boundaries have
4vanished, the front “has fixed” to a single species keeps
on expanding. In finite systems, L < ∞, fixation to a
single species always occurs since in our stochastic model
there is always a finite rate at which boundaries annihi-
late. Hence, two absorbing states exist. Eventually, the
expanding front will fix either to species 1 or species 2.
In Fig. 2(b), species 2 has a larger reproduction rate,
b20 > b
1
0, and therefore a constant selective advantage.
As the front expands faster at locations where it is com-
posed of species 2, the roughness of the front increases.
Indentations of the front usually are caused by sectors of
species 1, whereas species 2 creates bulges. Furthermore,
boundaries are biased such that sectors of species 2 widen
while sectors of species 1 shrink laterally. Hence, sectors
of species 2 merge and coarsen quickly. Eventually, the
expanding front will fix to species 2, which has almost
happened in Fig. 2(b).
If the reproduction rates depend on the state of near-
est neighbors (frequency-dependent selection), new pat-
terns arise. In this article we are mainly interested in
frequency-dependent selection and therefore set b01 =
b02 = 1 from here on. We now discuss some interesting
cases, see Fig. 2(c)–(d), which correspond to well-known
settings in game theory [14–16].
In coordination games (R > T and P > S), see
Fig. 2(c), the front expands slower near boundaries than
in the centers of sectors. Therefore, indentations in the
front are typically found where boundaries currently are
or recently have been. After sectors have coarsened for
some time, most individuals are located inside sectors.
Therefore, most of them only have neighbors of their own
kind, which raises the average reproduction rate and the
overall front advances faster.
In snowdrift games (R < T and P < S), see Fig. 2(d),
the front expands faster near boundaries. They annihi-
late less frequent as compared to Fig. 2(c) since narrow
sectors grow faster. Boundaries are also strongly twisted
and associated with bulges of the front.
In this article we are mostly interested in social dilem-
mas where one species (called cooperators) raises the
reproduction rate of all neighbors regardless of their
species. The increased reproduction rate is called a pub-
lic good in game theory, since it is of benefit to all nearby
individuals, but it also costs resources. In contrast, the
other species (called defectors) takes advantage of the
public good for its own reproduction, but does not con-
tribute to the reproduction of its neighbors in the same
way. Defectors save resources for their own reproduction
and therefore have an advantage. In this scenario de-
fectors do not at all contribute to reproduction of their
neighbors and, therefore, we set S = P = 0 and just
vary R and T . According to Eq. (1), these two parame-
ters increase the respective reproduction rates of coopera-
tors and defectors if they have cooperating neighbors. In
Fig. 2(e) we present a setting, where species 2 (defectors)
rapidly takes over large parts of the front. Defectors ben-
efit from the initially large number of boundaries, where
they take advantage of nearby cooperators, and conquer
C
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FIG. 3. Schematics of possible scenarios in an expanding
public goods game. Depending on the parameters R, S, T,
and P of Eq. (1), cooperators (C, blue) and defectors (D, red)
advance with different speeds, as indicated by arrows. (a)
Cooperators outrun the trailing defectors. From an advanced
position along the front cooperators can then expand laterally
and take over the front. (b) A thin layer of defectors keeps
up with the cooperators’ sector and, eventually, completely
covers the cooperators.
most of the front. Only cooperators, living in sufficiently
large sectors, can keep up with the front during this early
period and may then take over the front, depending on
the parameter values.
In a situation like this, it is not a priori clear if the
front eventually fixes either to cooperators or to defec-
tors. Depending on the values of R and T , cooperators
can either outrun defectors and, from their advanced po-
sition at the front, overgrow their competitors laterally,
see Fig. 3(a). Or, defectors cover cooperators with a thin
layer and thereby take over the front, see Fig. 3(b). Close
to the transition between both scenarios, the front dis-
plays increasing roughness since both species are able to
take over while their fronts grow with different speeds. To
characterize this transition quantitatively, we performed
extensive simulations and applied methods from surface
roughening [63, 70–72] and the theory of phase transi-
tions dealing with absorbing states [72, 73].
IV. EXPANDING PUBLIC GOODS GAME:
CRITICAL BEHAVIOR
In this section we quantitatively analyze the transi-
tion between long-term cooperation and long-term defec-
tion for an expanding public goods game. As the transi-
tion is approached, several observables show critical scal-
ing [72, 73]. Following our earlier work [67], we perform
finite-size scaling to localize the transition. Furthermore,
we determine critical exponents and thereby establish a
new universality class for the transition between the two
adsorbing states. In the vicinity of the transition we also
study the dynamics of the sector boundaries including
the decline of their mean number during coarsening and
their superdiffusive motion as well as the roughening of
the expanding front.
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FIG. 4. Probability Pfix of the front to fix to cooperators
plotted versus T for several system sizes L at R = 0.1. Er-
ror bars give the standard error of the mean for each data
point. Lines are fits of the data points to the Fermi function,
1/ exp(c(T − T1/2) + 1), where T1/2 and c are fit parameters.
Inset: The transition point T1/2(L) relative to the fitted crit-
ical value Tc ≈ 1.58 (black crosses) follows a power law in
L→∞: Tc − T1/2(L) = (A/L)1/4.2 (black line).
A. Finite-size scaling and phase diagram
As boundaries merge, sectors coarsen and the system
progresses towards one of the two absorbing states. At
finite system sizes L this is a stochastic process and both
adsorbing states are reached with a certain probability.
However, in the thermodynamic limit, L→∞, the mag-
nitude of fluctuations relative to the mean value goes to
zero and one of the absorbing states is reached with cer-
tainty. We now use the method of finite-size scaling to
determine the transition point between both states [73].
In Figure 4 we present the probability Pfix that the
front fixes to cooperators and plot it versus T for several
lattice sizes L at R = 0.1. We distinguish two regimes:
one where cooperators dominate (Pfix(T , L) > 12 ) and
one where defectors take over. We locate the transition
point at T1/2(L) by Pfix(T1/2(L), L) = 12 . As L→∞, Pfix
converges to a step function, since in infinite systems the
absorbing states are reached with certainty. The step is
positioned at Tc := limL→∞ T1/2(L). From the theory
of critical scaling applied to absorbing states, we expect
that close to the critical point Tc the states of the lattice
sites are correlated on the transverse distance ξ⊥. Ap-
proaching Tc, ξ⊥ diverges as |∆|−ν⊥, where ∆ := Tc − T
is the distance to the critical point and ν⊥ is a critical ex-
ponent. For finite systems, an absorbing state is reached
if
L ≈ ξ⊥ ∼ |∆|−ν⊥ . (2)
The transition occurs at T1/2(L) and rearranging Eq. (2),
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FIG. 5. Phase diagram of the two-species public goods game
with range expansion. Parameter regimes, where the expand-
ing front fixes either to cooperators or defectors in large sys-
tems with L → ∞, are indicated by blue and red shade, re-
spectively. Red crosses are from simulations with system size
L = 1000, where defectors always outcompeted cooperators
(Pfix = 0) while blue dots identify events where cooperators
survived (Pfix > 0). The black diamonds indicate critical
points Tc for L → ∞ determined from finite-size scaling (see
Eq. (3) and Fig. 4). Note that in finite systems defectors have
an advantage in a larger parameter region.
we obtain
T1/2(L) ≈ Tc − (A/L)1/ν⊥ . (3)
The characteristic length A is related to the microscopic
length scale, which here is the lattice constant, and de-
tails of our model. It is not important to the following
analysis. The inset of Fig. 4 shows the best fit of our data
to Eq. (3), which yields the critical exponent ν⊥ ≈ 4.2
and the critical point Tc ≈ 1.58 at R = 0.1.
The above procedure can be repeated for different val-
ues of R to map out the phase diagram (see Fig. 5).
One realizes that the benefit of cooperators from their
own species, R, has a much more pronounced influ-
ence on the final state than the defectors’ benefit from
cooperating neighbors, T . This makes sense, since at
large times t  1 the front contains large single-species
sectors. Hence, the number of sector boundaries Nb,
where defectors can benefit from cooperators, is small:
Nb  L. Therefore, almost all cooperators have coop-
erating neighbors, while only a few defectors have this
advantage. This is an example of “preferential assort-
ment”, where the benefit of cooperation is almost entirely
available to other cooperators [15, 31, 32, 43–45, 74, 75].
So, for a wide range of parameter combinations coopera-
tors can indeed outcompete defectors. However, for large
enough T the dynamics at the boundaries still determines
the final state of the front and defectors outcompete co-
operators.
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FIG. 6. Mean time to fixation tfix as a function of defector
benefit T for various system sizes L at R = 0.1. The inset
depicts the rescaled fixation time, where ∆ = Tc − T. All
data collapse on a single master curve for critical exponents
ν‖ = 3.5 ± 0.1 and ν⊥ = 4.2 ± 0.1 and critical point Tc =
1.59 ± 0.03. Accordingly, tfix grows with L and the position
of its maximum approaches Tc for L→∞.
B. Critical exponents of the phase transition
In the previous section IV A we already encountered
the critical exponent ν⊥. We now continue to determine
further critical exponents of the phase transition. These
exponents are universal. They only depend on the dimen-
sion of the system, the number of components of the order
parameter, and symmetries of the model [72, 73]. They
are independent of microscopic details and do not vary
along a phase transition line. Our system has properties
similar to “compact directed percolation” (CDP) [76].
This is a stochastic process with a flat front, which also
has two distinct absorbing states. Using this similarity,
we proceed by determining critical exponents, which are
known for CDP [73], and compare both models.
At the critical transition, T = Tc, none of the two
species has an advantage. Heterogeneous fronts, com-
posed of more than one sector, exist for long times be-
fore the front fixes to one of the absorbing single-species
states. This can be quantified by the mean time to fix-
ation, tfix, presented in Fig. 6. The data show that the
fixation time has a maximum, the position and value of
which grow with system size.
Along the longitudinal direction, in which the front
propagates, states are correlated on the longitudinal dis-
tance ξ‖. As before, we expect it to scale like |∆|−ν‖ close
to the transition. Since the front propagates with a mean
velocity, ξ‖ is proportional to a correlation time. Close to
Tc this time becomes very long, which is known as critical
slowing down. Substituting Eq. (2) into ξ‖ ∼ |∆|−ν‖ , we
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FIG. 7. Survival probability PC of cooperators starting from
a single site plotted versus time for several values of T. Other
parameters are L = 1000 and R = 0.1. For T > Tc, PC
decreases exponentially, while for T < Tc the front fixes to
cooperators with a non-zero probability. At the transition
point Tc, the survival probability decays in time with a power
law with exponent β′/ν‖ = 2.2 ± 0.1. Inset: The number of
cooperator sites at the front, NC , decays exponentially in time
for T > Tc and is non-monotonic for T < Tc. At the transition
NC decreases with a power law with critical exponent Θ =
1.3± 0.1.
find the scaling relation
ξ‖ ∼ Lν‖/ν⊥ . (4)
We expect the mean fixation time to be proportional to
the correlation time ∼ ξ‖. Therefore, in the inset of
Fig. 6 we plot tfix rescaled by L
ν‖/ν⊥ versus ∆ rescaled by
L−1/ν⊥ . All curves of the main plot collapse on a single
master curve for Tc = 1.59± 0.03, and critical exponents
ν⊥ = 4.2± 0.1 and ν‖ = 3.5± 0.1. The values of Tc and
ν⊥ are in good agreement with our fit to Eq. (3). So,
fixation of the front is determined by the characteristic
time
τfix ∼ ξ‖ ∼ L0.83±0.05 . (5)
Two more critical exponents right at the transition are
related to the survival probability of one species or state,
which initially occupies a single site while all the other
sites are occupied by the other state. We choose a single
cooperator site in a line of defectors and determine the
probability PC(t) that after time t there are still cooper-
ators at the front and also calculate the average number
of cooperator sites at the front, NC(t). In Fig. 7 we plot
both quantities versus time for different defector bene-
fit T . At the transition situated between T = 1.55 and
1.6, we find that both PC and NC (see inset) decay with
power laws in time: PC(t) ∼ t−β′/ν‖ and NC(t) ∼ t−Θ.
The respective best fits yield β′/ν‖ = 2.2± 0.1 and Θ =
1.3± 0.1. Using our result for ν‖, we find β′ = 7.7± 0.6.
7TABLE I. Critical exponents for the phase transition to the
absorbing states (either long-term global defection or long-
term global cooperation) for the expanding public goods game
with frequency dependent selection.
ν⊥ ν‖ β β
′ Θ
4.2± 0.1 3.5± 0.1 0 7.7± 0.6 1.3± 0.1
In general, in phase transitions to absorbing states the
critical exponent β governs the stationary density of “ac-
tive sites”, when approaching the transition [73]. In our
case, the “active” sites can either be cooperators or defec-
tors. Since the stationary state is either an all cooperator
or an all defector front, the density ∼ |Tc − T |β jumps
from 0 to 1 and, hence, β is 0. Our results for all the
critical exponents are summarized in Table I.
The set of critical exponents determines the univer-
sality class of a phase transition. To our knowledge no
other non-equilibrium transition has been found, which
shares the same set of exponents. Hence, the transition
between long-term cooperation and long-term defection
in our expanding public goods game with frequency de-
pendent selection constitutes a new universality class.
C. Dynamics of boundaries
In this section we investigate the dynamics of the
boundaries which separates sectors of cooperators and
defectors from each other. In rough fronts the local front
orientation is tilted against the main growth direction.
When the front grows further, this tilt directs the move-
ment of boundaries [26, 28]. Ultimately, when two of
them meet, they annihilate. In Fig. 8 we plot their mean
number Nb versus time for several values of the defector
benefit T . Right at the transition (dashed black line), Nb
shows a power law decay. We now discuss the different
regimes in Fig. 8.
For neutral systems, where frequency-dependent selec-
tion is absent (T = R = 0), any inclination of the front is
created by stochastic surface or Eden roughening [63, 70–
72]. The surface undulations obey KPZ-scaling [77] and
thereby drive the decay of Nb [26, 28]. Boundaries move
superdiffusively along the front with a mean-square dis-
placement proportional to t4/3 [27]. On average, they
annihilate after having traveled the mean distance L/Nb
between the boundaries, for which they need the time
∼ (L/Nb)3/2. Hence, boundaries annihilate with a rate
proportional to N
3/2
b , which implies
N˙b ∼ −N3/2b Nb . (6)
So, the number of boundaries decreases as
Nb(t) ∼ t−2/3 , (7)
as already observed by Saito and Mu¨ller-Krumbhaar [28].
This power law is excellently reproduced by our simu-
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FIG. 8. Mean number of sector boundaries Nb plotted as
a function of time for several values of T. Other parameters
are L = 1000 and R = 0.1. Solid black line: Nb(t) ∼ t−2/3,
as predicted in Ref. [28] for neutral growth (T = R = 0).
At large times the simulated curve deviates from the power
law due to finite system size. Dashed black line: Close to
the critical point T = Tc ≈ 1.6, we find a power-law decay
Nb(t) ∼ t−2.5.
lations in the case of neutral growth, R = T = 0, as
illustrated by the solid black line in Fig. 8.
For R 6= 0 and T 6= 0, species reproduce with different
rates. Hence, the fronts of two neighboring sectors (occu-
pied by different species) advance with different speeds.
This influences the tilt of the front orientation, in ad-
dition to stochastic roughening in neutral systems, and
thereby the movement of the separating boundary. Thus,
we do not expect Eq. (6) to be valid.
Indeed, Fig. 8 reveals different regimes for the mean
number of boundaries Nb. For T > Tc, Nb decays expo-
nentially in time in line with the exponential decay of the
survival probability PC in Fig. 7 and similar to the case of
selective advantage in Ref. [28]. For T < Tc boundaries
annihilate less frequently. Narrow defector sectors persist
in the front dominated by cooperators since almost all in-
dividuals in the defector sectors have cooperating neigh-
bors. This results in the upward curvature of the curves
in Fig. 8. However, the defector sectors cannot expand
laterally and ultimately loose contact to the front due to
random fluctuations, and Nb declines exponentially. At
Tc the number of boundaries decreases with a power law
Nb ∼ t−χ, where a new exponent χ ≈ 2.50±0.05 appears.
This power law implies that the number of boundaries de-
clines from the initial value Nb(t = 0) ∼ L to the order
of 1 in the coarsening time
τcoarse ∼ L1/χ ≈ L0.40±0.01 . (8)
Comparing with Eq. (5) reveals 1/χ < ν‖/ν⊥. This
suggests that for large systems fixing the front to one
species takes much longer than coarsening to a few sec-
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FIG. 9. Time evolution of two boundaries with initial dis-
tance L/2 in a system close to criticality (T = 1.6) and at
R = 0.1. Standard deviation σ of the transverse distance plot-
ted versus time t for several system sizes L. The boundaries
move superdiffusively. Initially, σ ∼ tη with η = 0.71 ± 0.05,
and consistent with Eden scaling (t2/3, bold black line). At
later times a crossover to σ ∼ tη′ with η′ = 0.9 ± 0.1 occurs
(dashed black line).
tors. Hence, the few remaining boundaries move differ-
ently compared to early times since they have to annihi-
late to fix the front to a single species.
To check if this is the case, we employ the initial con-
dition, where the front is composed of only two sectors of
size L/2 each, separated by two boundaries. We quantify
the boundaries’ random motion by monitoring the tem-
poral evolution of the standard deviation for the trans-
verse distance `⊥,
σ(t) :=
√
〈[`⊥(t)− 〈`⊥(t)〉]2〉 . (9)
We subtract the mean distance 〈`⊥(t)〉 to take care of any
transient drift, when the front relaxes from its initially
flat to the rough shape, and an expected small drift if T
is not exactly Tc.
From Fig. 9 we see that, for early times, σ grows like
a power law, σ ∼ tη, with η = 0.71 ± 0.05. This is
consistent with meandering boundaries induced by Eden
roughening, σ ∼ t2/3 [26–28]. We expect such a behavior
since the roughness of the front has not fully developed
yet. For large systems and later times we find a crossover
to σ ∼ tη′ with η′ = 0.9 ± 0.1. This confirms our ear-
lier statement that at late times the few boundaries re-
maining after coarsening move differently. Indeed, they
show an even stronger superdiffusive motion than Eden
scaling, which is associated with the long-lived and pro-
nounced surface undulations in systems with frequency-
dependent selection.
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FIG. 10. The width w of the front plotted versus time for
several system sizes L close to the critical point at T = Tc ≈
1.6. Inset: After rescaling time t by τ× ∼ L1/χ and width w
by w× ∼ Lγ/χ, the curves collapse onto a single master curve.
The solid black line indicates Eden roughening with w ∼ t1/3,
whereas the dashed black line shows selective roughening with
w ∼ t1.3 for t  τ×. Note that the saturation of w at large
times is due to the finite system size.
D. Surface roughening of the expanding front
We now discuss the surface roughness or undulations of
the expanding front and compare our results to the clas-
sical Eden model. We measure the roughness of a front,
which has not yet fixed to one species, by calculating its
width w for system size L and at time t:
w(L, t) :=
(
1
L
L∑
i=1
[
h(i, t)− h¯(t)]2)1/2. (10)
Here, h(i, t) is the longitudinal position of the front at its
transverse site i and h¯(t) is the mean position
h¯(t) :=
1
L
L∑
i=1
h(i, t) . (11)
Figure 10 plots the width w(L, t) close to the critical
point at T = Tc ≈ 1.6. Initially, the roughness of the
front grows like in the original Eden model [62]: w ∼ tγ ,
where the growth exponent γ = 1/3 belongs to the KPZ-
universality class [63]. At intermediate times a new
regime sets in, where w ∼ tγ′ increases with enhanced
growth exponent γ′ ≈ 1.3±0.1. This marks the transition
from Eden roughening to “selective roughening”. Here,
the typical shape of the front is determined by advancing
cooperator sectors and trailing defector sectors and ulti-
mately drives the accelerated increase in the front’s width
w. The crossover to this regime happens at time τ×,
which increases with system size L as Fig. 10 shows. This
9makes sense since we expect selective roughening to dom-
inate over Eden roughening when the lateral extension
of sectors is comparable to L, i.e., τ× ∼ τcoarse ∼ L1/χ.
Due to Eden roughening the width at the crossover is
w× ∼ τγ× ∼ Lγ/χ ≈ L0.13. Indeed, rescaling width and
time with w× and τ×, respectively, collapses all data in
Fig. 10 onto a single master curve, as the inset demon-
strates. To conclude, surface roughening close to critical-
ity occurs in two regimes. Until crossover time τ×, one
observes Eden roughening, whereas for times larger τ×
selective roughening occurs until the front fixes to one
species. The dynamics of the width of the front is sum-
marized by
w(L, t) ∼
{
tγ t τ× ∼ L1/χ ,
tγ
′
L(γ−γ
′)/χ t τ× .
(12)
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this work we studied a generalized Eden model,
where two species compete with each other at the rough
expanding front. Individuals of the two species influence
each other by frequency-dependent selection, which acts
between nearest neighbors. We analyzed the evolution-
ary dynamics at the expanding front, where single-species
sectors form and coarsen. Ultimately, the front fixes to
one species, which we identify with an absorbing state of
our model.
In its general form the model can implement several
scenarios including selective advantage, and also well-
known game theoretical settings like the snow drift game
or the coordination game. Each of them creates distinct
patterns, which should be analyzed in detail in future
work. For the prominent example of a public goods
game, we find that cooperators prevail in a wide param-
eter regime, as expected for a spatial version of a social
dilemma [15, 43–45]. For other parameter values defec-
tors take over the front, as usual.
We identify the transition between long-term coopera-
tion and long-term defection as a nonequilibrium critical
phase transition between two absorbing states. The set
of critical exponents (see Table I), which we determined
by analyzing critical and finite size scaling, shows that
the phase transition belongs to a new universality class.
We attribute this result to the fact that the front in our
model is rough and not flat as in usual absorbing states.
Close to the critical transition the front’s roughness ex-
hibits a crossover in time from slow Eden roughening
to fast selective roughening. Strong roughening has also
been observed at phase transitions in a related model by
Lavrentovich and Nelson [78].
Interestingly, the critical exponents determined in our
present work violate the so-called generalized hyperscal-
ing relation [79]
dν⊥ = ν‖Θ + β + β′ , (13)
where the number of transverse dimensions d is 1. This
relation holds for most universality classes of phase tran-
sitions to absorbing states [73]. It is not obvious why our
model does not obey the scaling relation.
The roughness of the front correlates with superdiffu-
sive motion of the boundaries separating sectors. Two
factors contribute to the movement of the boundaries on
long length scales. On the one hand, the direct competi-
tion between the species on either side of the boundaries
pushes them towards the sector composed of the more
slowly reproducing species. On the other hand, bound-
aries follow the local tilt of the front. In the public goods
game cooperator sectors are advanced, while defector sec-
tors lag behind. Near the critical transition, defectors
outcompete their direct cooperating neighbors but the
front is tilted towards sectors filled by defectors, so the
two factors move the boundaries in opposite directions.
At the phase transition both effects cancel and the front
fixes with equal probability to either species. The strong
roughening correlates with superdiffusive motion of the
boundaries with nearly ballistic scaling.
Accordingly, whether a species takes over the expand-
ing front is determined by two contributions: its repro-
duction rate relative to its competitor and its position
relative to the average front position. The influence of
different reproduction rates of neighboring species can
directly be compared and is summarized in the phrase
“survival of the fittest”. The position at the front deter-
mines the available space for progeny, which then have
the opportunity to expand sidewards. This is illustrated
by the phrase “survival of the fastest” [38].
In our model the number of sectors only decreases. It
does not include experiments with mutually beneficial
interactions between different species, which do not gen-
erate sectors [37, 80, 81]. In future extensions of our
model this may be remedied by including motility of in-
dividuals [82, 83], by allowing reproduction to more dis-
tant lattice sites [78], or by increasing the maximal num-
ber of individuals per lattice site from one. Moreover,
it is worthwhile to consider interactions ranging beyond
nearest neighbors, since biomolecules, released by indi-
vidual microorganisms, may diffuse in the extracellular
medium [84–86]. In the public goods game scenario this
would stabilize narrow sectors of defectors so that they
do not lose contact to the front.
In general, range expansion of multiple species will de-
velop enhanced roughness at the growing front. As we
demonstrated here, the corresponding models have new
and interesting statistical properties. From a biological
point of view, roughness is important. It affects the ter-
ritories that different species occupy and thereby their
evolutionary success through the strong random motion
of sector boundaries. This may also be relevant for range
expansion in a real environment and not just in a test
tube. To better understand the properties and conse-
quences of rough expanding fronts, further theoretical
work is needed. At the same time further experiments
should look for the fingerprint of roughness in microbial
10
colony growth.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank the research training group GRK 1558
funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for finan-
cial support. We further thank Erwin Frey, Maria Eckl,
Florian Gartner, and Raphaela Geßele for discussion and
collaboration on a related model.
[1] J. D. Murray, Mathematical Biology I. An Introduction,
3rd ed., Vol. 1 (Springer, 2007).
[2] R. W. Griffiths, D. W. Schloesser, J. H. Leach, and W. P.
Kovalak, Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 48, 1381 (1991).
[3] S. R. Loarie, P. B. Duffy, H. Hamilton, G. P. Asner, C. B.
Field, and D. D. Ackerly, Nature 462, 1052 (2009).
[4] I. C. Chen, J. K. Hill, R. Ohlemuller, D. B. Roy, and
C. D. Thomas, Science 333, 1024 (2011).
[5] E. Peacock et al., PLoS ONE 10, e112021 (2015).
[6] C. Stringer, Nature 423, 692 (2003).
[7] H. Liu, F. Prugnolle, A. Manica, and F. Balloux, Am.
J. Hum. Genet. 79, 230 (2006).
[8] C. Moreau, C. Bherer, H. Vezina, M. Jomphe, D. Labuda,
and L. Excoffier, Science 334, 1148 (2011).
[9] A. Bru´, S. Albertos, J. Luis Subiza, J. L. Garc´ıa-Asenjo,
and I. Bru´, Biophys. J. 85, 2948 (2003).
[10] J. B. Xavier, Mol Syst Biol 7, 483 (2011).
[11] L. Hall-Stoodley, J. W. Costerton, and P. Stoodley, Nat.
Rev. Micro. 2, 95 (2004).
[12] C. D. Nadell, J. B. Xavier, and K. R. Foster, FEMS
Microbiol. Rev. 33, 206 (2009).
[13] S. Mitri, J. B. Xavier, and K. R. Foster, Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA 108, 10839 (2011).
[14] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and
Population Dynamics, 1st ed. (Cambridge University
Press, 1998).
[15] G. Szabo´ and G. Fa´th, Phys. Rep. 446, 97 (2007).
[16] E. Frey, Physica A 389, 4265 (2009).
[17] A. Buckling, R. C. Maclean, M. A. Brockhurst, and
N. Colegrave, Nature 457, 824 (2009).
[18] J. A. Shapiro, BioEssays 17, 597 (1995).
[19] E. B. Jacob, Y. Aharonov, and Y. Shapira, Biofilms 1,
239 (1999).
[20] I. Golding, I. Cohen, and E. Ben-Jacob, Europhys. Lett.
48, 587 (1999).
[21] M. Matsushita, J. Wakita, H. Itoh, K. Watanabe,
T. Arai, T. Matsuyama, H. Sakaguchi, and M. Mimura,
Physica A 274, 190 (1999).
[22] T. Matsuyama and M. Matsushita, Forma 16, 307 (2001).
[23] T. Vicsek, M. Cserzo, and V. Horvath, Physica A 167,
315 (1990).
[24] J.-i. Wakita, H. Itoh, T. Matsuyama, and M. Matsushita,
J. Phys. Soc. Jpn. 66, 67 (1997).
[25] M. Huergo, M. Pasquale, A. Bolza´n, A. Arvia, and
P. Gonza´lez, Phys. Rev. E 82, 031903 (2010).
[26] O. Hallatschek, P. Hersen, S. Ramanathan, and D. R.
Nelson, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 104, 19926 (2007).
[27] B. Derrida and R. Dickman, J. Phys. A 24, L191 (1991).
[28] Y. Saito and H. Mu¨ller-Krumbhaar, Phys. Rev. Lett. 74,
4325 (1995).
[29] B. J. Crespi, Trends Ecol. Evol. 16, 178 (2001).
[30] G. J. Velicer, Trends Microbiol. 11, 330 (2002).
[31] A. S. Griffin, S. A. West, and A. Buckling, Nature 430,
1024 (2004).
[32] J. U. Kreft, Biofilms 1, 265 (2004).
[33] S. A. West, S. P. Diggle, A. Buckling, A. Gardner, and
A. S. Griffin, Annu. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst. 38, 53 (2007).
[34] M. E. Hibbing, C. Fuqua, M. R. Parsek, and S. B. Pe-
terson, Nat. Rev. Micro. 8, 15 (2010).
[35] S. Mitri and K. Richard Foster, Annu. Rev. Genet. 47,
247 (2013).
[36] J. Gore, H. Youk, and A. van Oudenaarden, Nature 459,
253 (2009).
[37] M. J. Mu¨ller, B. I. Neugeboren, D. R. Nelson, and A. W.
Murray, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 111, 1037 (2014).
[38] J. D. Van Dyken, M. J. Mu¨ller, K. M. Mack, and M. M.
Desai, Curr Biol 23, 919 (2013).
[39] C. Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural
Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the
Struggle for Life (John Murray, 1859).
[40] R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Revised Edi-
tion (Basic Books, 2009).
[41] P. B. Rainey and K. Rainey, Nature 425, 72 (2003).
[42] J. S. Chuang, O. Rivoire, and S. Leibler, Science 323,
272 (2009).
[43] M. A. Nowak, S. Bonhoeffer, and R. M. May, Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA 91, 4877 (1994).
[44] H. Ohtsuki, C. Hauert, E. Lieberman, and M. A. Nowak,
Nature 441, 502 (2006).
[45] F. Fu, M. A. Nowak, and C. Hauert, J. Theor. Biol. 266,
358 (2010).
[46] A. Melbinger, J. Cremer, and E. Frey, Phys. Rev. Lett.
105, 178101 (2010).
[47] J. Cremer, A. Melbinger, and E. Frey, Sci. Rep. 2 (2012).
[48] J. B. Xavier and K. R. Foster, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
104, 876 (2007).
[49] C. D. Nadell, K. R. Foster, and J. B. Xavier, PLoS
Comput. Biol. 6, e1000716 (2010).
[50] D. Greig and M. Travisano, Proc. Biol. Sci. 271 (Suppl
3), S25 (2004).
[51] J. H Koschwanez, K. R Foster, and A. W Murray, PLoS
Biol. 9, e1001122 (2011).
[52] M. Sen Datta, K. S. Korolev, I. Cvijovic, C. Dudley, and
J. Gore, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 110, 7354 (2013).
[53] F. Pattus and M. A. Abdallah, J. Chin. Chem. Soc. 47,
1 (2000).
[54] C. Ratledge and L. G. Dover, Annu. Rev. Microbiol. 54,
881 (2000).
[55] C. D. Nadell and B. L. Bassler, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 108, 14181 (2011).
[56] J. van Gestel, F. J. Weissing, O. P. Kuipers, and A. T.
Kova´cs, ISME J. 8, 2069 (2014).
[57] M. A. Riley and D. M. Gordon, Trends Microbiol. 7, 129
(1999).
11
[58] D. M. Cornforth and K. R. Foster, Nat. Rev. Micro. 11,
285 (2013).
[59] V. T. Lee and O. Schneewind, Genes Dev. 15, 1725
(2001).
[60] M. F. Weber, G. Poxleitner, E. Hebisch, E. Frey, and
M. Opitz, J. R. Soc. Interface 11, 20140172 (2014).
[61] J. B. Xavier, W. Kim, and K. R. Foster, Mol. Microbiol.
79, 166 (2011).
[62] M. Eden, Proc of the Fourth Berkeley Symposium on
Mathematical Statistics and Probability 4, 223 (1960).
[63] A.-L. Baraba´si and H. E. Stanley, Fractal concepts in sur-
face growth, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1995).
[64] M. Plischke and Z. Ra´cz, Phys. Rev. A 32, 3825 (1985).
[65] R. Jullien and R. Botet, J. Phys. A 18, 2279 (1985).
[66] A. Ali and S. Grosskinsky, Adv. Complex Syst. 13, 349
(2010).
[67] J.-T. Kuhr, M. Leisner, and E. Frey, New J. Phys. 13,
113013 (2011).
[68] D. T. Gillespie, J. Comput. Phys. 22, 403 (1976).
[69] R. Jullien and R. Botet, Phys. Rev. Lett. 54, 2055 (1985).
[70] J. Krug and H. Spohn, in Solids far from Equilibrium,
edited by C. Godre`che (Cambridge University Press,
1992).
[71] T. Halpin-Healy and Y.-C. Zhang, Phys. Rep. 254, 215
(1995).
[72] G. O´dor, Rev. Mod. Phys. 76, 663 (2004).
[73] M. Henkel, H. Hinrichsen, and S. Lu¨beck, Non-
equilibrium phase transitions: Absorbing phase transi-
tions, 1st ed., Vol. 1 (Springer, 2008).
[74] W. D. Hamilton, J. Theor. Biol. 7, 1 (1964).
[75] W. D. Hamilton, J. Theor. Biol. 7, 17 (1964).
[76] J. W. Essam, J. Phys. A 22, 4927 (1989).
[77] M. Kardar, G. Parisi, and Y.-C. Zhang, Phys. Rev. Lett.
56, 889 (1986).
[78] M. O. Lavrentovich and D. R. Nelson, Phys. Rev. Lett.
112, 138102 (2014).
[79] J. F. F. Mendes, R. Dickman, M. Henkel, and M. C.
Marques, J. Phys. A 27, 3019 (1994).
[80] B. Momeni, K. A. Brileya, M. W. Fields, and W. Shou,
eLife 2, e00230 (2013).
[81] A. T. Kova´cs, Front. Microbiol. 5 (2014).
[82] T. Reichenbach, M. Mobilia, and E. Frey, Nature 448,
1046 (2007).
[83] A. Gelimson, J. Cremer, and E. Frey, Phys. Rev. E 87,
(2013).
[84] T. Julou, T. Mora, L. Guillon, V. Croquette, I. J. Schalk,
D. Bensimon, and N. Desprat, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 110, 12577 (2013).
[85] B. Allen, J. Gore, M. A. Nowak, and C. T. Bergstrom,
eLife 2, e01169 (2013).
[86] R. Menon and K. S. Korolev, Phys. Rev. Lett. 114,
168102 (2015).
